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ABSTRACT
Within last years multi-synchronous collaborative editing systems
became widely used. Multi-synchronous collaboration maintains
multiple, simultaneous streams of activity which continually diverge
and synchronized. These streams of activity are represented by
means of logs of operations, i.e. user modifications. A malicious
user might tamper his log of operations. At the moment of synchro-
nization with other streams, the tampered log might generate wrong
results. In this paper, we propose a solution relying on hash-chain
based authenticators for authenticating logs that ensure the authen-
ticity, the integrity of logs, and the user accountability. We present
algorithms to construct authenticators and verify logs. We prove
their correctness and provide theoretical and practical evaluations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Security and Protection]: [Authentication]; H.5.3 [Group
and Organization Interfaces]: [Computer-supported cooperative
work]; C.2.4 [Distributed Systems]: [Distributed applications]
General Terms
Security
Keywords
authenticating logs, multi-synchronous collaboration, authenticators,
optimistic replication, logs, operation-based history
1. INTRODUCTION
Collaboration is a key requirement of teams of individuals work-
ing together towards some common goal. In recent years collab-
orative editing systems such as wikis, GoogleDocs and version
control systems became very popular. These systems rely on a
multi-synchronous collaboration model [8, 15] that allows users to
work simultaneously on shared documents following some cycles of
divergence and convergence. Copies of the shared data diverge when
users work in isolation and converge later when users synchronize
their changes.
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The mechanism, that allows replicas to diverge during a time
interval ensuring that they will eventually converge at a later time,
is called optimistic replication [37]. Optimistic replication can
be classified into state-based and operation-based [20]. In state-
based replication each site applies updates to its replica without
maintaining a change log. Usually in systems adopting state-based
replication such as Active Directory in Windows Server and Coda
file system [38], every site sends its local state to other sites that
can merge the received state with their own states. Systems that use
operation-based replication such as Bayou [34], IceCube [18] and
GoogleDocs keep modifications performed on a replica in a history
which is then sent to other replicas. Operation-based approaches are
used when the cost to transfer state is high such as in database sys-
tems or mobile systems; and when operation-semantics is important.
In this work we target systems that use operation-based replication.
In operation-based replication systems users can misbehave by
tampering history for their convenience. For instance, they can
remove some content of the history or change the order of some
operations from the history. This might be critical for some collabo-
rative systems such as version control systems. It is vitally important
to be able to retrieve and run different versions of a software. If the
history can be modified, revisions do not correspond to the expected
behavior of the software. Moreover, developers cannot be made re-
sponsible for the revisions for which they contributed. Furthermore,
by modifying the history, a contributor may introduce security holes
in the system under the name of another contributor. Therefore,
there is a need to ensure integrity of the log, and in case the log was
tampered, the misbehaving user should be detected.
Solutions for securing logs can be classified into two main fam-
ilies: non-cryptographic secure logging and cryptographic secure
logging. The former approach is based on a secure logging machine
such as a write-only medium (e.g CD/DVD), a tamper-resistant-
hardware or a trusted hardware to prevent adversary from modifying
logs [3]. However, in real-world applications deployed over large
scale distributed environments, it is impractical to assume the pres-
ence of such devices. The later approach has been investigated
deeply with numerously extensive research (namely, [10, 11, 4, 5,
13, 14, 25, 27, 39, 43]). These existing solutions, however, are
adapted only for collaboration based on a single global stream of ac-
tivity over shared data. For instance, floor control policies [10] and
locking mechanisms [11] ensure a single global stream of activity
by allowing a single user at a time to access objects in the shared
workspace.
Multi-synchronous collaboration abandons constructing a single
stream of activity out of the history of all user activities. Instead,
it maintains multiple, simultaneous streams of activity, and then
manages divergence between these streams. Each user maintains
therefore different streams of the global history containing activity
of all users. Throughout this paper we call logs standing for these
different streams of activity. The main challenge that we address
in this paper is how to secure logs in the multi-synchronous collab-
oration. To our best knowledge, no existing work addressed this
issue.
In this paper, we propose a solution relying on hash-chain based
authenticators for securing logs in multi-synchronous collaboration.
The proposed authenticators ensure the authenticity and the integrity
of the logs, i.e. any log tampering is detectable. Moreover, the
proposed authenticators provide user accountability, i.e. any user
can be made accountable of her misbehavior on log tampering.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a context for
our work in Section 2. We then go on by presenting in Section 3 a
threat model and desirable properties our proposal tackles. We next
describe in Section 4 our proposed approach based on authenticators
including their definitions and examples of how they are constructed.
In Section 5, we present our algorithms to construct authenticators
and verify logs, and proofs of their correctness. We provide an evalu-
ation with real collaboration histories from projects using Mercurial
and an analysis showing the feasibility of our proposal in Section 6.
We give an overview of related works in Section 7. In Section 8, we
end the paper with some concluding remarks.
2. CONTEXT
Push-Pull-Clone (PPC) is the most general paradigm supporting
multi-synchronous collaboration. Users work simultaneously on
different streams of activity on the shared data. In the PPC model,
users replicate shared data, modify it and redistribute modified
versions of this data by using the primitives push, pull and clone.
These primitives are used for managing divergence and convergence
of different streams of activity. To start, users clone shared data
and maintain in a local workspace this data as well as modifications
done on this data. Users can then push their changes to different
channels at any time they want, and other users that have granted
rights may pull these changes from these channels. By using pull
primitives, replicas are synchronized. In Figure 1, an instantiation
of the PPC model with three users is illustrated. In this figure, user 1
and user 2 interact with each other by using push and pull primitives,
while user 3 performs a clone from user 2. The PPC collaboration
model is very widely used in distributed version control systems
such as Git, Mercurial and Darcs. It is a very general collaboration
model without a collaboration provider where users share their data
only with people whom they trust. PPC model generalizes the
collaboration model with a service provider where users interact
only with a server that forwards afterward the changes to the other
users.
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Figure 1: Push-Pull-Clone paradigm
We consider the operation-based collaboration where user changes
are kept in a log that is then sent to the other users and logs are
merged at synchronizations. We consider a system with a num-
ber of sites which can operate independently on replicas of shared
documents. Each site keeps the shared document as a log of op-
erations that have been performed during a collaborative process,
L = [op1,op2, ...,opn]. Each operation is parameterized depending
on an application domain. A shared document can be as large as a
database (i.e. Bayou) or as small as a single file. Operations can be
treated at different granularities ranging from characters, lines or
paragraphs in a document to deltas between revisions. A document
is created at one site and replicated to other sites by means of push
and clone primitives. Sites store operations in their logs in an order
that is consistent with the order they were generated.
The order of addition of operations in the log is compatible with
the “happened-before” relation between operations [19]. We say
that opa happened-before opb, denoted as opa_ opb, if opb was
generated on some site after opa was either generated or received
by that site. The “happened-before” relation is transitive, irreflexive
and antisymmetric. Two operations opa and opb are said concurrent
if neither opa_ opb nor opb_ opa.
Changes on the shared document made by users are propagated
in weakly consistent manner from one site to another site. Users
decide by means of primitives push and pull when, with whom and
what data to be sent and synchronized. When a pull is performed
by user 1 from the channel where user 2 pushed his changes, in
order to minimize traffic overhead, an anti-entropy mechanism is
used [6]. Only the part of the log of user 2, that is new to user 1
since the last time that two users synchronized, is sent to user 1. The
remote log from user 2 is synchronized with the local log of user
1. The synchronization mechanism requires to detect the concur-
rency and happened-before order between changes of different sites.
Also the conflicts between concurrent changes must be resolved.
Replicas are consistent if their states are identical when they have
applied the same set of operations. For our approach, we use the
CRDT family of algorithms [36, 42] which design operations to
be commutative from the start. When reconciliation is performed,
operations from the remote log, that have not been previously in-
tegrated into the local log, are simply appended to the end of the
local log. The log propagation mechanism uses anti-entropy which
preserves happened-before order between operations. Therefore, the
reconciliation mechanism ensures happened-before order between
operations as well as it allows concurrent operations to appear in
logs in variant orders.
We define a partially ordered set (poset) H = (P,_) where P is a
ground set of operations and “_” is the happened-before relation
between two operations of P, in which “_” is irreflexive and transi-
tive. We call H as an operation-based history in our context. Given
a partial order “_" over a poset H, we can extend it to a total order
“<t” with which “<t” is a linear order and for every x and y in H, if
x_ y then x <t y. A linear extension L of H is a relation (P,<t) such
that: (1) for all op1, op2 in P, either op1 <t op2 or op2 <t op1; and (2)
if op1_ op2 then op1 <t op2. This total order preserves the order
of operations from a partial order set H to the linear extensions on
the same ground set P.
We call these linear extensions as individual logs observed by
different sites. The Figure 2 shows an example of a history and its
linear extensions.
In collaborative systems, where multiple sites collaborate on the
same shared data object, we can consider that the global stream of
activity of all sites is defined by a partially ordered set of operations.
Each site, however, can see only operations in his workspace that
it generated locally or received from other sites. The site keeps
therefore an individual log as a linearization of history built on a
subset of a ground set of operations. There are remaining operations
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Figure 2: History and its linear extensions
of global history built on entire ground set of operations that are not
visible for the site.
3. SECURITY ASPECTS
In operation-based collaborative systems, authentication of data
items for collaborative workflows has gained increasing importance.
Say for example, if Tom receives a document from Olivia and
processes a part of it and then forwards to Pierre, the operation-
based document should include the chronological log of actions that
each user, Tom, Olivia and Pierre, performed on the document. The
correctness of collaboration outcome is based on the trustworthiness
of users who maintain the history of versions. Unfortunately, a
malicious user can always introduce phony updates to forge history
or alter the correct order of versions. This attack raises the threat that
honest users might get forged content of shared data. Replicas with
corrupted updates might never converge with other valid replicas
and this is critical in replication systems. This section presents
a threat model followed by desirable properties for dealing with
security requirements.
3.1 Threat Model
A threat model, which models the capabilities of attackers, is nec-
essary to analyze the threats that will be addressed by our solution.
There are two types of malicious users: insiders and outsiders.
We consider in this paper an inside adversary who has full rights
to access a replicated object. Such an adversary might want to
alter the history including actions performed on data by authorized
contributors. For example, when Tom provides a document to Olivia
who can perform and contribute new updates to the document, she
should not be able to modify actions that Tom performed which
were recorded in log.
We assume users trust each other with their social-based relation-
ship when they start to collaborate. However, trust it not immutable
and trusted users once they gained access to the log can always
misbehave. Such an active attacker can read, (over)write, delete and
change order of log entries. In doing so, an attacker alters existing
records or adds forged information to history.
Our work assumes only adversaries who act inside of the system.
We cannot prevent outsider attacks where an adversary copies data
to create a new document and claims at a later time as being an
owner. This might be possible in our system if an adversary removes
completely the log of operations, which corresponds to a document
removal. We could deal with outsider attacks with the support of
a trusted platform, however, we exclude this assumption in our
collaborative system.
3.2 Desirable Properties
The following properties are addressed to authenticate operation-
based history in collaborative systems.
Integrity. Adversaries are infeasible to forge a log, such as mod-
ify its entries or put new forged operations into log, without being
detected. Integrity is the most important property required for se-
curing logs in operation-based replication. Ensuring the integrity
of a single document can be done easily by using cryptographic
signatures or checksums. However, ensuring the integrity of a repli-
cated document represented by a log of operations is more difficult
as operations cross multi-contributors and some of them might be
adversaries.
Concurrency-collision-freeness. In a history H, some operations
might be concurrent, while some others might be in a happened-
before relation. If Li and Lj are different linearizations of the same
history H then any authentication mechanism applied to Li and Lj
should yield the same result. The “yielding the same result” is ex-
pressed by the concurrency-collision-freeness property: the authen-
tication mechanism holds a function f that f(Li) = f(Lj) ∀Li,Lj ∈ H.
The “concurrency-collision-freeness” property should be guaranteed
in authenticating logs.
In Figure 2, we give an example of a history which is linearized
into two logs by two sites. The history H, which is built on the
ground set of operations P = {op0, op1, op2, op3, op4, op5, op6}
with “_” relation, is recorded in logs, L1 = {op0, op1, op2, op3,
op5, op4, op6} and L2 = {op0, op2, op4, op1, op3, op6, op5}. They
both preserve orders of all operations of the history H. In order
to fulfill concurrency-collision-free property, any authentication
mechanism applied to L1 and L2 should yield the same result. If
the authentication results are different, then it means that one of the
logs was tampered.
Forward-aggregated authenticity. While logs grow, log verifiers
can skip verification of log entries which have been already authen-
ticated. The authentication mechanism should allow accumulation
of log verification for a time interval. Not only the integrity of
individual log entries but also the integrity of the whole log stream
should be preserved. This forward-aggregated authenticity property
is similar to forward security and append-only property investigated
in many existing works of secure log audit [1, 24, 43].
Public verifiability. This property allows any user in a collabo-
rative system to verify the integrity of logs. Adversaries are made
accountable for unauthorized actions. This property can be done
by using digital signatures such as RSA or DSA signature scheme.
Public verifiability is especially desirable in distributed collaborative
systems where logs need to be audited by any collaborator without
relying on any trusted central authority.
4. AUTHENTICATORS
In this section, we present our approach to construct authentica-
tors T@site to deter users from log tampering while preserving the
above mentioned properties.
When a sending site sends a document to a receiving site, it
creates an authenticator for its log. The authenticator is attached to
the sent document. The receiving site creates a new authenticator
when it receives the document. We assume each site involved in this
push-pull communication possesses a cryptographic public/private
key pair that is assigned to a unique site identifier and that all
users can retrieve the public key of each other. This assumption is
reasonable in practice [41, 29]. The private key of the key pair is
used to sign entries of log that prevent malicious sites modifying
operations on behalf of other sites. Though sites can choose a public
key pair on their-own, to limit Sybil attacks [7] we can require that
each site possesses a digital certificate from trusted certification
authority or has an offline channel (such as email) to identify the
owner of public keys. In either case the certification authority plays
no role in the process of authenticator creation, and it is used only
during initial phase when a site joins the system. We also use
cryptographic hash function with properties collision-resistant (it
should be difficult to find two different messages m1 and m2 such
that hash(m1) = hash(m2)) and preimage-resistant (with a given
hash value h, it should be difficult to find any message m such
that hash(m) = h). The collision-resistant property can be used
to establish the uniqueness of logs at a certain moment when an
authenticator is created.
4.1 Definitions
An authenticator is a log tamper-evident which captures a sub-
sequence of operation(s) of a log that were generated in one updating
session. An updating session at one user’s site is the session be-
tween two subsequent push/pull primitives to/from other sites. For
example, consider that during a working session, user U generates a
log [op1, op2] where op1_ op2. When user U pushes his changes,
he creates an authenticator for the sequence of operations in the
log that their orders should not be tampered by any other user. For
instance, a receiver of this log should not be able to re-order op1
and op2 to change the happened-before order of op1 and op2.
Definition 1. An authenticator, denoted as T@site, is defined as a
tuple 〈ID, SIG, IDE, PRE, SYN〉 where:
ID: identifier of authenticator which is a tuple < siteID,opID >
where siteID is the identifier of the site which creates the authenti-
cator and opID is the operation identifier(s) that the authenticator
is linked to;
SIG: the value of signature signed by the private key of the site;
IDE: a list of operation identifiers used to compute SIG;
PRE, SYN: identifiers of preceding and receiving authenticators.
Definition 2. The SIG of an authenticator T@site at a certain update
is computed as a signature of a cumulative hash by a sender S or
a receiver R, where the sender computes SIG of the most recent
authenticator Tm@S .SIG = σS(hash(Tm–1@S .SIG || E)) with condition
that E 6=∅; and the receiver computes Tn@R = σR(hash
(Tn–1@R .SIG || E || Tm@S .SIG) with the condition that there exists
new update(s) from S appended to log of R, where:
Tm@S : the most recent authenticator committed by sender S;
Tn@R : the most recent authenticator committed by receiver R;
Tm–1@S : the preceding authenticator of Tm@S ;
Tn–1@R : the preceding authenticator of Tn@R ;
E = [opi1 ,opi2 , ...,opir ]: subsequent changes generated after pre-
ceding authenticator;
σsite(·) denotes the signature of site and || denotes the concate-
nation of arguments used in hashing, where hashing can be done
using any traditional hash function such as SHA-256).
The structure of an authenticator is illustrated in Figure 3.
When a user shares a document by sending the whole log, she
creates an authenticator for log operations computed based on the
preceding authenticator and new updated operations. The authenti-
cator is signed by her private key and linked to the last operation of
the log. At the receiving site, the receiver performs reconciliation
and creates a new authenticator at the reception.
The authenticators of a log of operations are constructed whenever
a site sends or receives a new change to/from another site. An
authenticator is created in following cases:
• A site sends new changes to other sites. In this case, if a site
sends a document without new changes, no new authenticator
is needed.
• A site receives new changes from other sites. In this case, the
receiving site will check the remote log, detect and resolve
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Figure 3: Structure of an authenticator.
conflicts (if there are some conflicts among operations). After
these actions, if there are new changes that are added to the
receiver’s log, a new authenticator is created for this reception.
4.2 Example
We use the example of history in Figure 2 where two sites col-
laborate on a shared document having initial version V0|{op0} to
illustrate the construction of authenticators. We assume that the
initial version of the document V0 consisting of operation op0 was
created by some site among collaborating sites. We further as-
sume that all collaborators agreed on this initial version and that
the corresponding log of this initial version does not need to be au-
thenticated. Each of the two sites in our example performs parallel
contributions based on the initial version of the document. In the
example, site 1 creates the new version V1|{op0,op1} and site 2
creates V2|{op0, op2} concurrently. At a later time, site 1 reconciles
with updates from site 2 and creates the up-to-date version V3 |
{op0, op1, op2, op3}. In Figure 4, the two sites, site 1 and site 2,
will create authenticators to authenticate their logs each time they
do pushing or pulling. In what follows we describe in detail how
authenticators are constructed.
op0 op1 op2 op3 op5 op4
op0 op4op2 op1 op3 op6
op6
op5
T1@site 2
T1@site 1 T2@site 1
T2@site 2
T3@site 1
T3@site 2 T4@site 2
Site 1
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Figure 4: Example of constructing authenticators.
Firstly, when site 2 pushes his log to site 1, it creates an authenti-
cator T1@site2 where:
T1@site2 .ID = < site2,op2 > (linked to op2),
T1@site2 .SIG = σsite2(hash(∅ || op0 || op2))
T1@site2 .IDE = [op0, op2]
T1@site2 .PRE = ∅ (no previous authenticator)
T1@site2 .SYN = ∅ (no received remote authenticator)
When site 1 pulls changes from site 2 and receives the log from
site 2, it creates an authenticator T1@site1 where:
T1@site1 .ID = < site1,{op1,op2} > (linked to op1, op2),
T1@site1 .SIG = σsite1(hash(∅ || op0 || op1 || T1@site2 .SIG)),
T1@site1 .IDE = [op0, op1],
T1@site1 .PRE = ∅ (no previous authenticator),
T1@site1 .SYN = T1@site2 .ID
The two sites site 1 and site 2 then work concurrently and generate
the new changes op3 and op4 respectively. When site 1 pushes his
changes and site 2 pulls those changes, two authenticators T2@site1
and T2@site2 are constructed. The structure of T2@site1 is given below:
T2@site1 .ID = < site1,op3 > (linked to op3),
T2@site1 .SIG = σsite1(hash(T1@site1 .SIG || op3)),
T2@site1 .IDE = [op3],
T2@site1 .PRE = T1@site1 .ID,
T2@site1 .SYN = ∅
Similarly, T2@site2 is computed where:
T2@site2 .ID = < site2,{op3,op4} > (linked to op3, op4),
T2@site2 .SIG = σsite2(hash(T1@site2 .SIG || op4 || T2@site1 .SIG)),
T2@site2 .IDE = [op4],
T2@site2 .PRE = T1@site2 .ID,
T2@site2 .SYN = T2@site1 .ID
Again, site 1 and site 2 contribute independently to the document,
op5 is generated by site 1 and op6 is generated by site 2. The two
sites then exchange their changes with each other by pushing and
pulling other changes. New authenticators are computed at each site.
site 2 computes T3@site2 where:
T3@site2 .ID = < site2,op6 > (linked to op6),
T3@site2 .SIG = σsite2(hash(T2@site2 .SIG || op6)),
T3@site2 .IDE = [op6],
T3@site2 .PRE = T2@site2 .ID,
T3@site2 .SYN = ∅
site 1 computes T3@site1 where:
T3@site1 .ID = < site1,{op5,op6} > (linked to op5, op6),
T3@site1 .SIG = σsite1(hash(T2@site1 .SIG || op5 || T3@site2 .SIG)),
T3@site1 .IDE = [op5],
T3@site1 .PRE = T2@site1 .ID,
T3@site1 .SYN = T3@site2 .ID
In the last step shown in Figure 4, site 1 pushes his changes to
site 2 and site 2 pulls these changes from site 1. Because there are
no new operations since the authenticator T3@site1 was created, no
new authenticator is created by site 1. However, the receiving site
site 2 has to create a new authenticator since a new operation op5 is
added to the log. T4@site2 is therefore computed where:
T4@site2 .ID = < site2,{op5,op6} > (linked to op5, op6),
T4@site2 .SIG = σsite2(hash(T3@site2 .SIG || ∅ || T3@site1 .SIG)),
T4@site2 .IDE = [],
T4@site2 .PRE = T3@site2 .ID,
T4@site2 .SYN = T3@site1 .ID
We will discuss in next section the algorithms supporting the
creation and verification of logs as well as prove that the proposed
algorithms satisfy desired properties which we mentioned at the
beginning of this paper.
5. ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present algorithms to construct authenticators
and verify logs based on authenticators. We also provide a proof of
correctness of these algorithms.
5.1 Authenticators Construction
Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm for the construction of the
authenticator when a sender pushes his changes. An authenticator
is computed from the its preceding authenticator and the current
generated operations. The algorithm takes as argument the log of the
sending site S and generates as output the authenticator computed
by the sender site. The condition E 6=∅ ensures that an authenticator
is created only if the sender has generated new changes; otherwise
the sender sends the log without computing a new authenticator.
Algorithm 2 presents the algorithm for the construction of the
authenticator when a receiver site pulls changes from a sender site.
An authenticator is computed from the preceding authenticator of
local log, the current operations generated by the receiver and the
most recent authenticator of the remote log. The algorithm takes as
arguments the two logs of sending site S and receiving site R and it
generates as output the authenticator computed by the receiver site.
If there are no new operations sent by the sender that have to be
added to the log of the receiver, then the receiver will not compute a
new authenticator. Note that in synchronizing logs, authenticators
that are linked to operations must be also kept in the local workspace
as they authenticate previous operations in the log.
Input: sending site S with its log LS
Output: Tm@S
1 begin
2 E← list of new operations S generates after Tm–1@S ;
3 if E 6= ∅ then
4 Tm@S .ID← <S, identifier of most recently local
operation at S>;
5 Tm@S .SIG← sign(hash(Tm–1@S .SIG || E));
6 Tm@S .IDE← E;
7 Tm@S .PRE← Tm–1@S .ID;
8 Tm@S .SYN← ∅ ;
9 else
10 Tm@S ← 〈〉;
11 return Tm@S ;
Algorithm 1: Construct an authenticator for a sender
Input: sending site S, receiving site R and their logs LS, LR
Output: Tn@R
1 begin
2 E← list of new operations R generates after Tn–1@R ;
3 ES ← list of new operations from LS added to LR;
4 if ES 6= ∅ then
5 Tn@R .ID← <R, Tm@S .ID.opID ∪ identifier of most
recently local operation at R>;
6 Tn@R .SIG← sign(hash(Tn–1@R .SIG || E || Tm@S .SIG));
7 Tn@R .IDE← E;
8 Tn@R .PRE← Tn–1@R .ID;
9 Tn@R .SYN← Tm@S .ID;
10 else
11 Tn@R ← 〈〉;
12 return Tn@R ;
Algorithm 2: Construct an authenticator for a receiver
We will consider time and space complexities of algorithms to
construct and verify authenticators. Note that, for the space complex-
ity for verification of authenticators, we exclude the space complex-
ity for maintaining the log. The algorithm to create an authenticator
in Algorithms 1 or 2 is O(1) in time, and O(|Δ|) in storage, where
Δ is the set of operations whose identifiers are kept in T@site.IDE.
Since an authenticator is created each time a site sends or receives
changes, the number of authenticators on a replicated object created
by site S is the total number of interactions the site has done with
other sites. Let Γ be the total number interactions of one site. Then
each site needs O(Γ · |Δ|max) space for all authenticators, where
|Δ|max is the maximum Δ of all authenticators. In synchronization,
one log is updated to become the union of two logs of sites S and
R, and the new log shall need O(ΓS · |ΔS|max +ΓR · |ΔR|max) space
for all authenticators. We can see that the storage complexity de-
pends on the number of interactions and the number of operations
generated by two sites.
5.2 Authenticators-based Log Verification
The Algorithm 3 presents a mechanism to verify log entries based
on authenticators. When a site receives a log of operations ac-
companied by authenticators, it verifies the log based on these au-
thenticators corresponding to entries in the log. The main idea of
verification is to check the authenticity of operations preserved by
valid authenticators, including checking:
• If authenticators are valid (their signatures are correct). An
authenticator is checked by verifying its digital signature
using the public key of signer.
• If the log entries are corresponding to these valid authentica-
tors. When an authenticator passes signature checking, the
content and the order of operations are taken into account in
the verification.
If all of these checkings pass, the log is authenticated. In contrast,
a log with either operations not authenticated or authenticated by
invalid authenticators is unauthorized. With any detection of the
corrupted data or falsified order of changes, authenticators will
be not valid and the verification algorithm returns negative result.
Authenticators help users being aware of attacks and once the log is
unauthorized, the site which sent tampered log is made accountable
for the misbehavior.
Input: site R, log L
Output:
1 begin
2 Q← Tn@R ∈ L;
// Q: queue of authenticators to verify
3 verified← True;
4 while Q 6= ∅ do
5 T← Q.get();
6 check1← T.SIG is correct;
7 check2← order of operations in L corresponds to
T.IDE list;
8 check3← T.PRE precedes operations in T.IDE;
9 check4← T.PRE and T.SYN precede T.ID;
10 if check1 & check2 & check3 & check4 then
11 mark operations in T.IDE as checked;
12 put(Q, T.PRE);
13 put(Q, T.SYN);
14 else
15 verified← False;
16 break;
17 if any operation in L is not checked then
18 verified← False;
19 return verified;
Algorithm 3: Verify a log
Let us revisit the example in the previous section (see Figure.4).
Let us assume one of two sites site 1 or site 2, for instance, site 2
shares the document by sending its log to another site, say site 3.
Then site 3 will verify the log it receives from site 2. To verify log,
site 3 has to verify the validity of authenticators and log entries. If
it already received one part of log before, site 3 can skip checking
every authenticator linked to that part. We now describe the worst
case when site 3 receives the log from site 2 for the first time and
therefore every authenticator needs to be checked. site 3 performs
the following steps of the log verification procedure.
It starts by checking the most recent authenticator of site 2 T4@site2 .
• Verify T4@site2 .SIG by using site 2’s public key.
• Verify T4@site2 .IDE. As T4@site2 .IDE = [] then check2 and
check3 can be skipped.
• Verify the order of T4@site2 .ID (linked to op5, op6) and T4@site2 .PRE
= T3@site2 .ID (linked to op6) by checking if the log is main-
tained correctly (if op6 is logged before op5). Similarly, the
order of T4@site2 .ID and T4@site2 .SYN = T3@site1 .ID (linked to
operations op5 and op6) is checked.
• Since T4@site2 was constructed based on T3@site2 and T3@site1 ,
these authenticators are put into a queue Q in order to be
recursively verified.
If every above check passes then the authenticator T4@site2 is said
valid. For other authenticators in queue Q, the verification is per-
formed recursively and each verification follows steps in Algorithm
3. The verification finishes when queue Q is empty. The final
checking result is only positive if all checks return positive result.
Otherwise, the log will be not authenticated. Note that in this ex-
ample, any deletion or re-ordering of operations is detectable. For
instance, if site 2 tries to re-order operations op2 and op3, this attack
will be detected by authenticating the authenticator T2@site1 which is
linked to op3. We can see site 2 cannot forge this order on behalf
of site 1 since site 1 signed the authenticator linked to op3. How-
ever, any re-ordering of concurrent operations will not change the
verification result. The proof will be presented later.
Authenticators-based log verification has O(1) complexity in
space and O(Γ) in time, where Γ is the total number of authen-
ticators in the log. Since authenticators of a log are linked as a
hash-chain in which an authenticator is linked to its preceding one,
and due to the forward-aggregated authenticity property, it is enough
to authenticate the log by checking only the most recent authenti-
cator of a log. This verification process requires checking of all
preceding authenticators. Therefore, the time complexity depends
on the total number of all authenticators.
5.3 Proofs of Correctness
The algorithms, that have been presented previously for authenti-
cators construction and logs verification, ensure the desirable prop-
erties for authenticating logs which are linearized from operation-
based history.
THEOREM 1. A log is tamper-detectable by using authentica-
tors. A misbehaving site cannot selectively insert, delete or change
the happened-before order of other sites’ operations from the begin-
ning or the middle of the log without being detected by next audit
(Integrity).
PROOF. Let M be the misbehaving site who receives a log L =
[op1, op2, . . . , opi, opi+1, opj–1, opj] from site R. Let us assume opi
and opi+1 were generated by R and opj–1 and opj were received by
R from S. Log L is accompanied with authenticators and the most
recent authenticator is Tj@R which is linked to operations (opi+1,
opj). Following Definition 1 and Definition 2, Tj@R consists of:
Tj@R .ID = <site R, {opi+1, opj}> (linked to operations opi+1, opj),
Tj@R .SIG = σsiteR(hash(Ti@R .SIG || opi || opi+1 || Tj@S .SIG)),
Tj@R .IDE = [opi, opi+1],
Tj@R .PRE = Ti@R .ID,
Tj@R .SYN = Tj@S .ID
There are three cases that M can attack the log as follows.
• Case 1 - misbehaving site M removes operations at the begin-
ning or in the middle of the log.
(i) If M selectively removes any operation in range from opi
to opj from L, i.e. opi is removed by M but M still keeps
opi+1. The authenticator Tj@R is then either invalid (missing
of opi) or replaced by T′j@R . However, T
′
j@R is invalid since it
should be signed by R and M cannot forge R’s signature on
T′j@R .
(ii) If M removes any operation before opi, i.e. op1 is removed,
then the authenticator Ti@R is invalid and this makes Tj@R
invalid consequently.
Therefore, if a misbehaving site removes any operation in the
middle of the log, the log will not be authenticated by valid
authenticators.
• Case 2 - misbehaving site M changes the happened-before
order of operations on behalf of others.
If M changes the happened-before order of any operations
from opi to opj then the operations list Tj@R .IDE will be in-
valid. When opi+1 is generated by site R, opj is generated
by site S, and R receives opj from S after generating opi,
opi+1, we say opi+1 and opj are concurrent and other users
can change the order of opi+1 and opj. In the case of changing
order of concurrent operations, the authenticator Tj@R is still
valid (it passes the check of Algorithm 3 - line 7). However,
if R continues to work on the document and adds new opera-
tion opk after opj, then commits an authenticator Tk@R , other
sites cannot change the order of opi, opj and opk since this
misbehavior will make the authenticator Tk@R invalid by the
checking procedure in Algorithm 3 - line 8.
Therefore, if a misbehaving site changes any happened-before
order, the log will not be authenticated.
• Case 3 - misbehaving site M inserts an operation at the be-
ginning or into the middle of log.
We assume misbehaving site M inserts an operation opm in
the middle of existing log between opi and opj.
If M claims operation opm was generated by site R then the log
will be not authenticated since none of existing authenticators
of site R authenticates opm and it therefore cannot pass the
verification process in Algorithm 3 - line 17, 18.
If M claims opm was generated by himself, then it needs to
commit an authenticator to authenticate opm. In such case,
opm is considered concurrent with other operations, so it
can be inserted into any position in the log L and L is still
authenticated.
Therefore, a misbehaving site only can insert its own opera-
tions into its local log. The site cannot claim its insertion as
operations on behalf of others because it cannot authenticate
such operations.
In summary, it is impossible to forge the integrity of a log without
being detected by using authenticators.
THEOREM 2. Authenticators preserve concurrency-collision-
freeness property.
PROOF. In the proof of theorem 1, we use a log L of site R,
LR = [op1, op2, . . . , opi, opi+1, opj–1, opj]. We assume operations
opi, opi+1 are concurrent with opj–1, opj. Thus the order between
them can be interchangeable in any linearization of history. Let us
consider that site S maintains a different log of same history LS =
[op1, op2, . . . , opj–1, opj, opi, opi+1]. We will prove that the log
verification will return the same result on checking LS and LR.
When sites S and R share logs with each other, we suppose that
Ti@R and Tj@R are committed by site R before and after receiving
the log from site S; Tj@S and Ti@S are committed by site S before
and after receiving log from site R. The log verification by checking
Ti@S and Tj@R yields the same result regardless the order of concur-
rent operations. Indeed, Ti@S and Tj@R are valid only if they pass
four checks (Algorithm 3, line 6 - 9). Consider check1 and check2
were passed, therefore they must pass check3 and check4 to be com-
pletely verified. The check3 only deals with the order of preceding
authenticator against operations list IDE (Ti@S with opi, opi+1, Tj@R
with opj–1, opj) and these orders are preserved as proved in Theorem
1. The check4 deals with the orders of preceding and synchronized
authenticators with respect to the committed authenticator. Since
Tj@R is committed after Ti@R and Tj@S (linked to operations opi+1,
opj), the check4 for Tj@R passes. Similarly, the check4 for Ti@S
passes. Therefore, regardless the logging order of concurrent oper-
ations, the verification yields same result of checking two logs LS
and LR.
THEOREM 3. Authenticators are forward-aggregated.
PROOF. This property is achieved by using hash-chain based
authenticator, so that Ti@site .SIG includes Ti–1@site .SIG in its con-
struction.
THEOREM 4. Every site which is in possession of history can
verify authenticators by using the public key of the site which com-
mitted them. A site which created an authenticator cannot deny
having constructed it (public verifiability).
PROOF. Non-repudiation is an important feature of digital signa-
tures. By this property, a site that has signed authenticators cannot at
a later time deny having signed them. Suppose that site S has signed
an authenticator for operations op1, op2, ..., opi and shared them with
another site. At later time, site S wants to change the history by
removing opi (e.g insert line X). In that case, site S should add a new
operation opj (e.g delete line X) instead of removing operation opi
since this will make authenticator Ti@S invalid. Once a log has been
shared with other sites, site S cannot remove its operations due to
the using of non-repudiation signature for committed authenticators.
Authenticators are linked to operations and replicated together with
logs, therefore anyone can authenticate them.
6. EVALUATION
We are going to present a practical evaluation of our proposed
algorithms to authenticate logs. As the time complexity for the
creation of authenticators is not significant, we evaluated the time
complexity of the algorithm for log verification based on authentica-
tors. Verification is done when a site clones or pulls remote log and
it needs to check if the remote log is shared correctly without any
tampering.
We carried out experiments on real logs from projects that used
Mercurial as a distributed tool for source code management. We
chose randomly two projects: Hgview project [22] and one branch
of OpenJDK project [31]. The project Hgview includes almost 700
committed patches stored in repository gathering contributions from
20 developers with 115 interactions between them. One branch of
OpenJDK stored about 350 committed patches in repository which
were created by 31 developers with 253 interactions between them.
A committed patch is a sequence of operations that a user commits.
It is also called a log entry. We implemented our experiments by
using Python programming language.
In the histories of projects developed with Mercurial or any other
distributed version control system, we are unable to know when
a user pulls changes. We can only have information about push
operations. We therefore considered the worst case scenario where a
pull is performed at each new entry in the repository by an arbitrary
user Y that had never interacted before with any other user X that
contributed to the project. If previous interactions were taking place
between users Y and X, an optimization could be applied.
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Figure 5: Time overhead to check authenticators created for
Hgview and OpenJDK repositories.
In the experiment, we have first traversed the repository to extract
entries and user names who contributed to the project. Then we
generated for each user one RSA key pair which is later used to sign
authenticators. Authenticators are created based on linearized logs
of repositories. Finally, verification time is measured for the worst
case scenario where a newcomer clones the repository and she has
to check all authenticators created by previous contributors. The
results are computed by the average values of five run times. Figure 5
presents the experimental results for the worst case behavior. In two
experiments with the input data from Hgview project and OpenJDK
project, the checking time grows linearly with the increasing number
of authenticators. It is observed that it takes less than 50 milliseconds
(ms) to verify a log if its size is less than 100 entries (this size is
common for the size of all files observed in these projects). However,
to check the whole repository, the verifying time depends mostly
on the number of interactions between users (this means also the
number of authenticators). In Figure 5, we notice that the runtime
to verify log of the Hgview project is less than that of OpenJDK
project even though its log size is bigger.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the results is that adding
authenticators to secure logs does not create a significant time over-
head for collaborative systems even for the worst case. Sites can
reduce the time to verify log by skipping authenticators which are
already checked when previous pulls were performed.
7. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give a review of existing securing log schemes
and highlight their non suitability for securing operation-based his-
tory in multi-synchronous collaboration.
Several works introduce a trusted server to be used for verification.
This approach makes the system open to a single point of failure.
Peterson et al. [35] presents an approach to secure version history
in a versioning file system. The approach proposed a design of a
system based on generating message authentication codes MACs
for versions and archiving them with a third party. A file system
commits to a version history when it presents a MAC to the third
party and at a later time, an auditor can verify this history. Thus it
requires that the system trusts the third party that maintains MACs
correctly. In the general model of multi-synchronous collaboration,
users have no need to rely on a trusted third party and therefore any
user should be able to verify logs.
In a similar direction, Haeberlen et al. designed PeerReview [12]
to provide accountability and fault detection for distributed systems.
It guarantees the eventual detection of all Byzantine faults. Peer-
Review framework contains tamper-evident logs and commitment,
consistency and audit protocols. However, each node should have
an identical log with others. It does not support that each node
can keep different orders of operations as in operation-based multi-
synchronous collaboration where users maintain different streams of
activity on the shared data. The framework offers three applications
of overlay multicast, network file system and peer-to-peer email,
however, all of these applications do not deal with parallel modifica-
tions of data that is the case in multi-synchronous collaboration.
The integrity of audit logs has traditionally been protected through
the use of one-way hash functions. There is a line of work that
addresses the forward-secure stream integrity for audit logs. Ma et
al. proposed a set of secure audit logging schemes and aggregate
signatures [24, 23, 25]. Forward security ensures the integrity of
log entries in the log stream and no selective deletion or re-ordering
to stream is possible. Recently, Yavuz et al. proposed their work
to secure audit log such as BAF [43] that was developed to achieve
at the same time the computationally efficient log signing and the
truncation-attack-resistant logging. This work could be applied only
for a particular case of the multi-synchronous collaboration where
all users maintain the same linearization of the collaboration history.
However, it cannot be applied for the general case of the multi-
synchronous collaboration where users work on different streams of
activity on the shared data corresponding to different linearizations
of collaboration history.
There is another line of work that relies on authenticated data
structures to secure logs in distributed systems [9, 28, 27, 33]. While
these approaches are computationally efficient, they do not deal with
history for collaboration. Maniatis et al. introduced Timeweave [27]
that uses a time entanglement mechanism to preserve the history
state of distributed systems in a tamper-evident manner. However,
Timeweave does not handle the information flows synchronized
which is required in optimistic replication where concurrent opera-
tions appear in different orders in replicas.
Apart from above approaches, there are works that address secur-
ing logs for replication systems. Spreitzer et al. [40] uses hash chain
to protect modification orders of a weakly consistent, replicated data
system. Kang et al. [17, 16] proposed SHH for optimistic replication
using hash values as in Merkle tree [30] for revision identifiers to
protect causality of version history. It serves mainly for the purpose
of securing version history construction when the log was pruned
in limited storage environments such as mobile computing; and for
checking distributed replicas’ convergence. By ensuring decentral-
ized ordering correctness, SHH can guarantee that all updates are
not vulnerable to a decentralized ordering attack. However, SHH
cannot ensure the integrity of data in the sense that it is original
or forged. Using SHH the sender signature cannot be included in
summary hashes since that makes them different even if the merged
versions are identical, thus it makes replicas diverge. Without digi-
tal signature in summary hashes, SHH cannot protect history from
attacks of unauthorized actions and it cannot provide authenticity
and accountability. Similar approaches to SHH in which hashes are
used as identifiers are implemented in distributed version control
systems such as Git history [21] and Mercurial history [32].
Concerning securing document history, Hasan et al. [13] proposed
a mechanism of preventing history forgery for a document history
where a document refers to a file or database. In [13], the term
“provenance” is used for the history of the ownership of items and
actions performed on them. The authors present a provenance-aware
system prototype that captures history of document writes at the
application layer. To prevent all potential attacks on provenance
chain, it requires trusted pervasive hardware infrastructure at the
level where tracking is performed. However, contributions to the
shared document/database are done sequentially and the approach
does not deal with merging of parallel contributions to the shared
document.
A different work, Mella et al. [29] proposed a framework to the
document control flow in a highly distributed environment. The
proposal is aimed at cooperative updates on a document flow with
delegation and security policies. However, it considers one stream
of update process rather than a multi-way flow of updating with
reconciliation as in multi-synchronous model. Moreover, security
access control policies are defined at document’s attributes level
that means each document atomic element is marked with a label
containing a set of access control policies that apply to it. The
approach described in [29] secures different XML elements, while
we aim to secure patches of operations.
In the domain of database security, Mahajan et al. [26] proposed
Depot to secure replicated database in the cloud. Among all issues
addressed in Depot, we focus on the issues of consistency, integrity
and authorization. Depot addresses these issues in the context of
database where data is stored in the form of key/value and update is
the main operation performed over database. We consider collabora-
tive systems with more operations beyond update, i.e. insert, delete
content to/from the shared document. Depot ensures consistency
by using version vectors and version history hashes. Each update is
signed by authorized node to enforce consistency and integrity. This
would be too costly in a collaborative working environment where
users produce a huge number of operations on the shared document.
Our approach secures logs without requiring that each user signs
each operation. Authenticators are created for a patch of operations
each time the log is pushed/pulled to/from one user.
The state of the art of secure audit logging research was also
surveyed by Accorsi [2]. Though secure audit logging was inten-
sively investigated, we are not aware of any work that ensures secure
audit logs for a collaboration history with partial order where users
maintain different total ordered logs of the collaboration history
corresponding to their activity streams.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a technique using authenticators to
face security challenges in operation-based multi-synchronous col-
laboration. In multi-synchronous model, users work simultaneously
on different streams of activity. As the collaboration progresses,
the streams of activity continually diverge and synchronize. Au-
thenticators are used to ensure integrity and authenticity of logs
of operations corresponding to different streams of activity during
a collaborative process. While tamper-resistance is impossible to
be ensured in multi-synchronous collaboration without a central
provider, tamper-detection should be guaranteed. We presented an
approach for securing logs that made misbehaving users account-
able in collaborative systems without the need of a central authority.
We provided proofs of correctness of our approach and analyze
the complexities of our algorithms. We also conducted a set of
experiments testing our proposed approach on real histories of col-
laboration extracted from real projects using Mercurial. The results
show the feasibility of our approach that can be used to provide secu-
rity, trustworthiness and accountability to distributed collaborative
systems.
Acknowledgment
This work is partially funded by the ANR national research grant
STREAMS (ANR-10-SEGI-010).
9. REFERENCES
[1] M. Abdalla and L. Reyzin. A new forward-secure digital
signature scheme. In Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and
Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
(ASIACRYPT’00), pages 116–129, London, UK, 2000.
Springer-Verlag.
[2] R. Accorsi. Safe-keeping digital evidence with secure logging
protocols: State of the art and challenges. In Proceedings of
the 2009 Fifth International Conference on IT Security
Incident Management and IT Forensics (IMF ’09), pages 94
–110, Stuttgart, Germany, September 2009.
[3] C. N. Chong, Z. Peng, and P. H. Hartel. Secure audit logging
with tamper-resistant hardware. In Proceedings of the 18th
IFIP TC11 International Conference on Information Security,
Security and Privacy in the Age of Uncertainty (SEC’03),
pages 73–84, Athens, Greece, May 2003. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
[4] S. A. Crosby and D. S. Wallach. Efficient data structures for
tamper-evident logging. In 18th USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 317–334, Montreal, Canada, August 2009.
[5] D. Davis, F. Monrose, and M. K. Reiter. Time-Scoped
Searching of Encrypted Audit Logs. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Information and
Communications Security (ICICS’04), pages 532–545,
Malaga, Spain, October 2004.
[6] A. Demers, D. Greene, C. Hauser, W. Irish, J. Larson,
S. Shenkcr, H. Sturgis, D. Swinehart, and D. Terry. Epidemic
Algorithms for Replicated Database Maintenance. In
Proceedings of the Sixth annual ACM Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC’87), pages 1–12,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, aug 1987. ACM Press.
[7] J. R. Douceur. The sybil attack. In Revised Papers from the
First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
(IPTPS’01), pages 251–260, London, UK, 2002.
Springer-Verlag.
[8] P. Dourish. The parting of the ways: divergence, data
management and collaborative work. In Proceedings of the
fourth conference on European Conference on
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (ECSCW’95), pages
215–230, Norwell, MA, USA, 1995. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
[9] M. T. Goodrich, R. Tamassia, and A. Schwerin.
Implementation of an authenticated dictionary with skip lists
and commutative hashing. DARPA Information Survivability
Conference and Exposition,, 2:68–82, 2001. Los Alamitos,
CA, USA.
[10] S. Greenberg. Personalizable groupware: accommodating
individual roles and group differences. In Proceedings of the
second conference on European Conference on
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (ECSCW’91), pages
17–31, Norwell, MA, USA, 1991. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
[11] S. Greenberg, M. Roseman, D. Webster, and R. Bohnet.
Human and technical factors of distributed group drawing
tools. Interacting with Computers, 4(3):364–392, 1992.
[12] A. Haeberlen, P. Kouznetsov, and P. Druschel. Peerreview:
practical accountability for distributed systems. Proceedings
of the 21st ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles
(SOSP’07), 41:175–188, October 2007. Stevenson,
Washington, USA.
[13] R. Hasan, R. Sion, and M. Winslett. The case of the fake
picasso: Preventing history forgery with secure provenance. In
7th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
(FAST’09), pages 1–14, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2009.
[14] J. E. Holt. Logcrypt: forward security and public verification
for secure audit logs. In Proceedings of the 2006 Australasian
workshops on Grid computing and e-research - Volume 54
(ACSW Frontiers ’06), pages 203–211, Darlinghurst,
Australia, 2006. Australian Computer Society, Inc.
[15] C.-L. Ignat, S. Papadopoulou, G. Oster, and M. C. Norrie.
Providing Awareness in Multi-synchronous Collaboration
Without Compromising Privacy. In Proceedings of the ACM
Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work
(CSCW’08), pages 659–668, San Diego, California, USA,
November 2008. ACM Press.
[16] B. B. Kang. S2D2: A Framework for Scalable and Secure
Optimistic Replication. PhD thesis, EECS Department,
University of California, Berkeley, Oct 2004.
[17] B. B. Kang, R. Wilensky, and J. Kubiatowicz. The hash
history approach for reconciling mutual inconsistency. In
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS’03), pages 670–677,
Washington, DC, USA, 2003. IEEE Computer Society.
[18] A.-M. Kermarrec, A. Rowstron, M. Shapiro, and P. Druschel.
The icecube approach to the reconciliation of divergent
replicas. In Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM
symposium on Principles of distributed computing
(PODC’01), pages 210–218, New York, NY, USA, 2001.
ACM.
[19] L. Lamport. Time, Clocks, and the Ordering of Events in a
Distributed System. Communications of the ACM,
21(7):558–565, 1978.
[20] E. Lippe and N. van Oosterom. Operation-based merging.
Proceedings of the fifth ACM SIGSOFT symposium on
Software development environments, 17:78–87, November
1992. New York, NY, USA.
[21] J. Loeliger. Collaborating with Git. Linux Magazine, June
2006.
[22] Logilab.org. hgview.
http://www.logilab.org/project/hgview.
[23] D. Ma. Practical forward secure sequential aggregate
signatures. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on
Information, computer and communications security
(ASIACCS’08), pages 341–352, New York, NY, USA, 2008.
ACM.
[24] D. Ma and G. Tsudik. Extended abstract: Forward-secure
sequential aggregate authentication. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 86–91, 2007.
[25] D. Ma and G. Tsudik. A new approach to secure logging.
ACM Transactions on Storage (TOS), 5(1):1–21, 2009.
[26] P. Mahajan, S. Setty, S. Lee, A. Clement, L. Alvisi, M. Dahlin,
and M. Walfish. Depot: Cloud storage with minimal trust.
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 29(4):12:1–12:38,
Dec. 2011.
[27] P. Maniatis and M. Baker. Secure history preservation through
timeline entanglement. In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 297–312, Berkeley, CA, USA,
2002. USENIX Association.
[28] P. Maniatis and M. Baker. Authenticated append-only skip
lists. Acta Mathematica, 137:151–169, 2003.
[29] G. Mella, E. Ferrari, E. Bertino, and Y. Koglin. Controlled and
cooperative updates of xml documents in byzantine and
failure-prone distributed systems. ACM Transactions on
Information and System Security (TISSEC), Volume 9,
9:421–460, November 2006. New York, NY, USA.
[30] R. C. Merkle. Secrecy, authentication, and public key systems.
PhD thesis, Stanford, CA, USA, 1979. AAI8001972.
[31] OpenJDK. OpenJDK. http://openjdk.java.net.
[32] B. O’Sullivan. Mercurial: The Definitive Guide. O’Reilly
Media, 2009.
[33] C. Papamanthou, R. Tamassia, and N. Triandopoulos.
Authenticated hash tables. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security
(CCS’08), pages 437–448, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[34] K. Petersen, M. J. Spreitzer, D. B. Terry, M. M. Theimer, and
A. J. Demers. Flexible update propagation for weakly
consistent replication. In Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM
symposium on Operating systems principles (SOSP’97), pages
288–301, New York, NY, USA, 1997. ACM.
[35] Z. N. J. Peterson, R. Burns, G. Ateniese, and S. Bono. Design
and implementation of verifiable audit trails for a versioning
file system. In Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on
File and Storage Technologies, pages 20–20, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2007. USENIX Association.
[36] N. M. Preguiça, J. M. Marquès, M. Shapiro, and M. Letia. A
commutative replicated data type for cooperative editing. In
ICDCS, pages 395–403, 2009.
[37] Y. Saito and M. Shapiro. Optimistic replication. ACM
Computing Surveys, Volume 37, 37:42–81, March 2005. New
York, NY, USA.
[38] M. Satyanarayanan, J. J. Kistler, P. Kumar, M. E. Okasaki,
E. H. Siegel, David, and C. Steere. Coda: A highly available
file system for a distributed workstation environment. IEEE
Transactions on Computers, 39:447–459, 1990.
[39] B. Schneier and J. Kelsey. Cryptographic support for secure
logs on untrusted machines. In Proceedings of the 7th
conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7, pages
4–4, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1998. USENIX Association.
[40] M. J. Spreitzer, M. M. Theimer, K. Petersen, A. J. Demers,
and D. B. Terry. Dealing with server corruption in weakly
consistent, replicated data systems. In Proceedings of the 3rd
annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile
computing and networking (MobiCom’97), pages 234–240,
New York, NY, USA, 1997. ACM.
[41] K. Walsh and E. G. Sirer. Experience with an Object
Reputation System for Peer-to-Peer Filesharing (Awarded
Best Paper). In Proceedings of the 3rd conference on
Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 3
(NSDI’06), Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006.
[42] S. Weiss, P. Urso, and P. Molli. Logoot-Undo: Distributed
Collaborative Editing System on P2P Networks. IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
21(8):1162–1174, Aug. 2010.
[43] A. A. Yavuz and P. Ning. Baf: An efficient publicly verifiable
secure audit logging scheme for distributed systems. In
Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, (ACSAC’09), pages 219–228,
Washington, DC, USA, 2009. IEEE Computer Society.
